Proposal for an An AI Penny Auction Agent
2014-09-29 00:00:00 +0000
Proposal: Learning Agent for Penny-Auction Games
Main Research Questions and Core Research Objectives
Since the inception of the popularized “penny-auction” in the early 2000s, there has been much study to show that the base form of bidding fee auctions, as they are alternatively called, is essentially gambling. The simplest form of these games involves buying the ability to bid, known henceforth as bid credits, and with each bid credit used the auction price of the good for sale increases by a nominal amount, which is often one cent. Therefore the winning bidder ends up paying for the number of bid credits purchased and the final sale price of the good, which is usually considerably lower than its market value. The auctioneer on the other hand, takes home these costs to the winning bidder in addition to all of the bid credits used by the other n bidders. Acknowledging these similarities with a pure betting game, there have been many fundamental changes in the business models of these penny-auction sites over the years that merit additional research into potential strategies of playing these games, the profitability of the auctioneer in relation to gamification elements, and the asymmetry of information present for players.
In this proposal, we’ll focus efforts on one of most popular auction sites, DealDash, for much of our research and analysis. Since the time of publication of much of the existing literature on penny-auctions, the key changes to their implementations may be justified by the theory behind these types of auctions. In particular, DealDash, which is the acquirer of the heavily studied “Swoopo” domain [1], has mechanisms that minimize the gambling elements of penny auctions by reducing risk for players. One such element is the Buy-It-Now feature, which if you lose an auction, lets you get all of your placed bid credits back so long as you buy an instance of the good that you were bidding on for its full market value. Another is the “no jumpers” auction, which doesn’t allow new bidders to enter an auction once the auction price has passed $5.00. The latter mechanism in particular goes a long way to increase symmetry in information with regard to how many players are in an auction, a key research area expanded upon by Mitzenmacher, Byers, and Zervas [1].
As a student of both computer science and economics, this topic offers a fascinating research opportunity for me, as I believe strategies, which may be conceptually unintuitive to humans, might exist given the implementation of these “new” business tactics. This combined with the fact that there is also far more data available on these sources than ever before, gives me a yearning for data-driven strategies to playing the penny-auction game. More specifically, I am interested in training a reinforcement learning or deep learning agent to play the game of penny auctions.
Scientific Contributions and Knowledge Gaps
Much of the existing research surrounding penny auctions focuses on finding equilibrium behavior for players [2,3,4] and it can go a long way to help train an agent to participate in penny-auctions before the agent even “sees the field”, or actually participates in a penny-auction itself. To this extent, the findings of other researchers can help initialize the premises or beliefs of an agent, rather than have it start with no knowledge on how to play the game. According to Mitzenmacher et al., much of a player’s chance of winning, and inversely, the auctioneer’s profitability, is derived from the amount of information one has about the other bidders in the game. Knowing the number of other players, who they are, and their play histories is a crucial component for the strategy of playing the bidding game, and a machine can potentially interpret and calculate each of these tasks with much more speed and efficacy when compared to a human agent. My assumption here is also that human agents do not make their strategies based on which particular usernames are in the bidding pool with them.
It’s important to recognize where current research ends and what is needed however. Before starting we recognize that “fitting data is an improper approach for [model] validation, as many models with very different characteristics lead to power law behaviors” [1] and this acknowledgement will soon help us decide on our methods. Even in the worst case, under the assumption that playing penny-auctions is indeed probabilistic gambling [5], this research into building an agent to play the game could provide fascinating results as similar agents do with sports-betting [6, 7] and blackjack [8].
Methodology
The first step is to collect as much data as possible in combination with existing datasets available about penny auction sites [1, 9]. This would involve building listeners to gather bids by users in a time series for each active auction on a site (along with its parameters). It’s also possible to negotiate licensing of a given sites’ data with this permission, as the insights gleaned from an AI agent for their system could likely help company profitability in unexpected ways, especially for the companies with an illicit interest in shill bidding (they do exist) [10].
The next step would be training an agent based on the historical experiences of real life human agents. The data collected and its magnitude becomes extremely important here, and, if the strategy does not prove fruitful. I would focus my efforts on building instances of agents that map directly to actual human agents (by their usernames) that I could begin to use in multi-agent simulations. For the actual simulation itself, we’d build a simulated version of the penny-auction. Because there is a whole graveyard of now-defunct penny auction sites, acquiring the logical frameworks for these sites to pivot into a simulation is not out of the question.
With the success of one of these two methods, we would have the ability to do extensive controlled experimentation with regard to the economic theoretical implications of the “new” penny-auction game features, including “Buy-It-Now”, no-jumpers, bid packs, and fully symmetric player information and how these might affect the auctioneers profitability and player-type strategies. These results would be incredibly interesting to analyze and the framework would be quite powerful to put in the hands of fellow researchers, academics, and private interests. With full player information, one could do things in the vein of feasibly building out a fraud detection system that sniffs out shill bidders that are in employ of the auctioneers. The idea of q-learning or deep reinforcemnet learning agent playing penny-auction games is deeply interesting too, as it lies at the intersection of economic theory and computer science and seems to be a completely untapped research topic. I’d be excited to get feedback and hear thoughts from the market designers on this – especially regarding gleaning market insights from controlled simulations.
References
- M. Mitzenmacher, John Byers, Georgios Zervas. Information Asymmetries in Pay-Per-Bid Auctions: How Swoopo Makes Bank. Unpublished manuscript. Available at http://people.bu.edu/zg/publications/BMZ10b-arxiv.pdf, 2010.
- T. Hinnosaar. Penny Auctions. Unpublished manuscript at http://toomas.hinnosaar.net/, 2009.
- B. C. Platt, J. Price, and H. Tappen. Pay-to-Bid Auctions. Unpublished manuscript. Available at http://econ.byu.edu/Faculty/Platt, 2009.
- N. Augenblick. Consumer and Producer Behavior in the Market for Penny Auctions: A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis. Unpublished manuscript. Available at www.stanford.edu/ ~ned789, 2009.
- MacDonald, Colin Blake, ”The Economics of Penny Auctions” (2010). Summer Research. Paper 29. Available at http://soundideas.pugetsound.edu/summer_research/29, 2010.
- Vincent, James. “This startup is building AI to bet on soccer games”. Available at https://www.theverge.com/2017/7/6/15923784/ai-predict-sport-betting-gambling-stratage m. 2017
- Sipko, Michal. “Machine Learning for the Prediction of Professional Tennis Matches” . Available at https://www.doc.ic.ac.uk/teaching/distinguished-projects/2015/m.sipko.pdf. 2015.
- De Granville, Charles. “Applying Reinforcement Learning to Blackjack Using Q-Learning”. University of Oklahoma. Available at http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.493.7116&rep=rep1&type=pdf
- Swoopo Dataset. Available at http://cs-people.bu.edu/zg/swoopo-dataset.tar.gz.
- Weisbaum, Herb. “Bidbots sometimes used to rig Internet penny auction sites”. Available at https://www.nbcnews.com/business/bidbots-sometimes-used-rig-internet-penny -auction-sites-1C8673443. 2013.